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Abstract
During the recent credit crisis credit rating agencies (CRAs) became increas-
ingly lax in their rating of structured products, yet increasingly stringent
in their rating of corporate bonds. We examine a model in which a CRA
operates in both the market for structured products and for corporate debt,
and shares a common reputation across the two markets. We nd that, as a
CRAs reputation becomes good enough, it can be optimal for it to inate its
ratings with probability one in the structured products market, but inate
its ratings with a probability zero in the corporate bond market.
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1. Introduction
A striking feature of the period prior to the 2008 crisis is the divergence
of rating behavior between the bond and structured product markets: struc-
tured product ratings becoming more lax, bond ratings becoming more con-
servative. For instance, Blume et al. (1998) nd a trend over the period
1978-1995 towards increasingly conservative ratings in bond markets, and
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Baghai et al. (2011) conrm that this trend continued throughout the period
leading up to the 2008 crisis. Meanwhile, studies of structured product mar-
kets nd evidence of the opposite trend. In particular, Ashcraft et al. (2009)
document how, between 2005 and 2007, subordination levels on mortgage-
backed securities remained at while objective risk measures increased (see
also Stanton and Wallace, 2010).
This divergent rating behavior across markets is not explained by existing
theory. The analysis closest to ours, Mathis et al., (2009), MMR hereafter,
models a monopoly credit rating agency (CRA) that operates in both the cor-
porate bond and structured product markets. However, MMR do not model
CRA rating behavior in the bond market; instead, this market is captured
only through the inclusion in the CRAs payo¤ function of an exogenous term
capturing its constant revenue from rating bonds. Their model is, therefore,
unable to shed light on the divergence phenomenon. Opp et al. (forthcom-
ing) present a model in which, as in ours, the incidence of rating ination is
linked to the complexity of the underlying securities. Both models are able
to explain a cross-sectional di¤erence in rating standards between (simple)
bonds and (complex) structured products, but the Opp et al. model does not
account for the time series pattern of divergence in rating standards across
markets, i.e., why bond market ratings became strictly more conservative at
the same time as structured product ratings were becoming increasingly lax.
We propose an explanation of the divergence in credit ratings based on the
2
role of reputational spillovers between markets. In our model, a CRA oper-
ates sequentially in a bond market and a structured product market. The
two markets are interdependent as CRAs acquire a common reputation across
both markets that is jointly inuenced by rating quality in each. Realized
outcomes in each market generate bidirectional reputational spillover e¤ects,
which can be either positive or negative. This extends the model of MMR,
which allows only for a one-o¤ unidirectional spillover from the structured
product market to the bond market: bond market revenue is forfeited if the
CRA loses its reputation in the structured products market.
To emphasize the role of reputational spillover e¤ects, we assume the only
di¤erence between the two markets is that, in the relatively simple bond mar-
ket, investors can observe project quality ex post, and so infer the CRAs type
(truthful or opportunistic) with certainty when a (bad) project that receives
a good rating fails, i.e. perfect monitoring. However, in the (complex) struc-
tured product market, project failure does not fully reveal the CRAs type,
i.e. imperfect monitoring.
Over the decades preceding the 2008 crisis, the major CRAs built substan-
tial reputations for providing informative ratings (White, 2010). When, ac-
cordingly, we examine CRAs with su¢ ciently good reputation, our model
predicts that divergent rating behavior between markets may pertain: an
opportunistic CRA that is su¢ ciently far-sighted would nd it optimal to
lie about bad projects with probability one in the less informative market
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(structured products), but truth-tell about bad projects with probability
one in the informative (corporate bonds) market. This result suggests an
explanation based on reputational spillovers for the observed di¤erences in
rating behavior across markets in the pre-crisis period: CRAs may choose to
sti¤en rating standards in the informative market (bonds) to reduce the like-
lihood of a loss of reputation that would jeopardize their growing revenues
(arising from increasing lax rating standards) in the less informative market
(structured products).
Our ndings also have implications as to whether the concern for reputation is
su¢ cient incentive for CRAs to provide independent and objective credit-risk
analysis, rather than accommodate the interests of issuers. The literature has
not, so far, provided a clear answer. Part of the reason, we argue, is a failure
to account for the divergent rating behavior of CRAs in the corporate bond
and structured product markets. Hence, Covitz and Harrison (2003) examine
the US bond market between 1997 and 2002 and conclude that reputation
concerns e¤ectively discipline CRAs. However, analyses that instead consider
the market for structured products reach the opposite conclusion (Ashcraft
et al., 2009; Stanton and Wallace, 2010; He et al., 2011). Our ndings
suggest a resolution: a concern for reputational e¤ects may discipline a CRAs
operations in markets where monitoring is perfect (ex post), but fail to do
so when monitoring is imperfect.
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2. Model
There are two markets for nance: a market for corporate bonds (market
A) and a market for structured products (market B). In each period t =
0; 2; 4; : : : a rm wishes to issue corporate bonds in market A to nance an
investment project, and, for the same reason, in each period t = 1; 3; 5; : : :
a rm wishes to issue a structured product in market B. Thus markets A
and B operate in sequence. Project quality is a priori unknown, including to
the issuer. Irrespective of the means of nance, a project can be good with
probability , or bad with probability 1 . There is a monopoly CRA that
operates in both markets. The CRA perfectly observes the quality of each
project nanced in market A (corporate bonds) but imperfectly observes the
quality of each project nanced in market B (structured products). In market
B, a project of good (bad) quality is successful with probability pG 2 (0; 1)
(pB 2 (0; 1)), where pG > pB. The CRA communicates a rating (good or
bad) to the market; no investment takes place if a project is rated as bad.
MMR provide a detailed discussion of these assumptions.
The CRA can be of two types: committed (truthful) or opportunistic (prot-
maximizing). We assume (as in MMR) that an opportunistic CRA will never
give a bad rating to a good project, but might choose to give a good rating
to a bad project. Issuers and investors observe, in both markets, whether
past projects have been nanced, and whether they have succeeded. This
information is summarized by the posterior probability investors and issuers
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assign to the event that the CRA is truthful. This probability is denoted
q, and measures the CRAs shared reputation across markets A and B. A
(stationary) Markov strategy for an opportunistic CRA is a mapping
xi : [0; 1] 7! [0; 1] i = A;B;
where xi (q) is the probability that an opportunistic CRA will give a good
rating to a bad project in market i, when its reputation is q.
Investors and issuers behavior is described by the belief function
ai : [0; 1] 7! [0; 1] i = A;B;
where ai (q)  1  (1  q)xi (q) is the probability investors and issuers assign
to a bad project in market i obtaining a bad rating, given the reputation q
of the CRA. The rating fee in market i, I (ai), is a strictly increasing and
continuous function of the perceived rating accuracy in market i:
I : [0; 1] 7! [0; I (1)] :
We assume that the fee is paid only if the issue takes place.
At the end of each period, one of three possible outcomes is observed: Success
(S) when a good project is nanced; Failure (F ), when a bad project is
nanced; or No nancing (N). If we denote q as the prior probability that
the CRA is truthful, the posterior beliefs  i (qjz) following an outcome z 2
fS; F;Ng in market i are
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 A (qjS)  qSA = q;  B (qjS)  qSB = qpGpG+(1 q)xB(1 )pB ;
 A (qjF )  qFA = 0;  B (qjF )  qFB = q(1 pG)(1 pG)+(1 q)xB(1 )(1 pB) ;
 A (qjN)  qNA = qaA ;  B (qjN)  qNB =
q
aB
:
Failure in market A exposes an opportunistic CRA to investors, as this out-
come will never be observed if the CRA is truthful. In market B, however,
investors are unable to ascertain whether Failure is due to an opportunistic
CRA or a truthful CRA having observed an incorrect signal.
As discussed in the Introduction, CRAs enjoyed considerable reputations in
the years prior to the 2008 crisis. Our interest, therefore, is in the (stationary)
Markov-perfect equilibrium of this model for q su¢ ciently large. In such an
equilibrium, the CRA maximizes prots, investorsand issuersexpectations
are correct, and investors and issuers rationally update their beliefs. The
Bellman equations for an opportunistic CRA operating in both markets are
given by
VA (q) = max
xA2[0;1]
[(+ (1  )xA) I (aA) + fVB
 
qSA

+ (1  )xAVB (0) + (1  ) (1  xA)VB
 
qNA
g]; (1)
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VB (q) = max
xB2[0;1]
[(+ (1  )xB) I (aB) + f(pG + (1  ) pBxB)VA
 
qSB

+ ( (1  pG) + (1  ) (1  pB)xB)VA
 
qFB

+ (1  ) (1  xB)VA
 
qNB
g];
(2)
where ai is investorsequilibrium beliefs in market i. We assume the value
functions VA,VB to be continuous and non-decreasing in q. As discussed in
MMR (p. 662), it is straightforward to show that VA (0) = VB (0) = 0. Using
(1), the one-stage deviation principle for innite-horizon games implies that
xA = 1 is part of an equilibrium strategy if and only if
I (aA)  VB
 
qNA

; (3)
xA = 0 is part of an equilibrium strategy if and only if
I (aA)  VB
 
qNA

; (4)
and xA 2 (0; 1) is part of an equilibrium strategy if and only if
I (aA) = VB
 
qNA

: (5)
Analogous conditions for xB may be derived from (2) according to whether
I (aB) + 

pBVA
 
qSB

+ (1  pB)VA
 
qFB

exceeds, is less than, or equals
VA
 
qNB

.
Proposition 1. For a su¢ ciently good reputation, an opportunistic CRA
will inate its rating of a bad project in market B with certainty, i.e. xB = 1.
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Proof. xB = 1 is part of an equilibrium strategy if and only if
I (aB)  

VA
 
qNB
  pBVA  qSB  (1  pB)VA  qFB : (6)
For q = 1, qSA; q
S
B; q
F
B ; q
N
A ; q
N
B = 1, so VA
 
qNB

= VA
 
qSB

= VA
 
qFB

. There-
fore, (6) holds with strict inequality at q = 1 as the right side of (6) is zero,
and the left side is I (1) > 0. As I () and VA () are continuous in q, (6) holds
for q su¢ ciently close to 1. Hence xB = 1 for q su¢ ciently close to 1.
Proposition 1 is consistent with the increasingly lax rating behavior observed
in the structured products market as CRA reputation grew in the pre-crisis
era. MMR reach a similar nding in their Proposition 4.
We now investigate rating behavior in market A:
Proposition 2. For a su¢ ciently good reputation, an opportunistic CRA
that is su¢ ciently far-sighted ( > 2=
 
1 +
p
4+ 5

) will never inate its
rating of a bad project in market A, i.e. xA = 0.
Proof. xA = 0 is part of an equilibrium strategy if and only if (4) holds. We
now examine VB
 
qNA

at q = 1. When q = 1, equations (1) and (2) reduce
to
VA (1) = max
xA2[0;1]

(+ (1  )xA) I (1)
+ (+ (1  ) (1  xA))VB (1)

; (7)
VB (1) = max
xB2[0;1]
[(+ (1  )xB) I (1) + VA (1)] : (8)
As xB = 1 from Proposition 1, (8) reduces to
VB (1) = I (1) + VA (1) ; (9)
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in which case (7) yields
VA (1) = I (1) max
xA2[0;1]

+  + xA (1  ) (1  )
1  2 (+ (1  ) (1  xA))

: (10)
Solving the maximization problem on the left side of (10) gives
VA (1) =
(
+
1 2 I (1) 1     2 (1 + ) < 0;
1+
1 2I (1) otherwise;
so (9) implies
VB (1) =
(
(1+)
1 2 I (1) 1     2 (1 + ) < 0;
(1+)
1 2 I (1) otherwise:
Note that for 1    2 (1 + ) < 0, VB (1) > I (1). This implies that, since
VB () and I () are continuous and non-decreasing in q and aA  1, there
exists a large enough q < qNA < 1 such that VB (1) > VB
 
qNA

> I (1) 
I (aA) holds. Hence (4) holds, so xA = 0 for q su¢ ciently close to 1.
Proposition 2 implies that an opportunistic CRA that is also su¢ ciently far-
sighted will never give a good rating to rate bad projects in market A, but will
always do so in market B, for a su¢ ciently good reputation. As  < 1, the
far-sightedness requirement is always satised for   2=  1 +p5 t 0:62.
3. Conclusion
A striking feature of the years leading up to the crisis of 2008 is the diver-
gence of rating behavior between the bond and structured product markets:
structured product market ratings became more lax, bond market ratings
became more conservative. We o¤er a theoretical model consistent with this
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phenomenon based on the role of reputation spillovers between markets. In
particular, we have shown that an opportunistic CRA that is su¢ ciently
far-sighted, and with a su¢ ciently good reputation, reaches an equilibrium
in which it is optimal to lie about bad projects with probability one in the
less informative market (structured products), but, so as to prolong its rev-
enues from the less informative market, truth-tell with probability one in the
informative (corporate bond) market.
Our ndings suggest that a concern for reputation may discipline a CRAs
operations in markets where monitoring is perfect (ex post), but fail to do so
when monitoring is imperfect. We therefore echo the sentiments of Mariano
(2012) and Opp et al. (forthcoming) in suggesting that one way to generate
more accurate ratings might therefore be to increase the transparency of the
underlying securities.
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